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County Jail Reform in Kentucky - A
Second Look
INTRODUCTION
The past decade has witnessed a tremendous growth in
federal judicial intervention in the operation and maintenance
of state and local prisons and jails. Federal judges have ordered
various types of reform, ranging from the prohibition of certain
institutional practices' to jail closure absent extensive changes
in unconstitutional conditions. 2 Despite this growing activism
by the federal judiciary, Kentucky, for the most part, has done
little to ensure that its local jails meet constitutional stan-
dards. As a result, many of the local jails in Kentucky are
susceptible to constitutional challenges by prisoners. A suc-
cessful challenge could impose a substantial fiscal hardship on
many of Kentucky's smaller and poorer counties.
The Kentucky General Assembly has an opportunity to
enact programs to protect its cities and counties from the po-
tential problems raised by the spectre of federal judicial re-
form. One of the major programs presently under consideration
by the legislature calls for the ifnplementation of a system of
state-run district jails to replace the unorganized myriad of
county and city jails.3 The failure of the legislature to enact the
district jail proposal, or to formulate some other viable alterna-
tive, could well result in judicially-ordered jail reform in Ken-
tucky.
This Note will not present a statistical analysis of the ac-
tual physical conditions in Kentucky's local jails.4 Rather, the
Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969) (temporary restraining
order against the use of a "dry cell." A dry cell was a room used for solitary confine-
ment. It had no furnishings, a single hole in the floor for elimination of body wastes
and the only lighting was from artificial light filtering through "slit screens" in the cell
door).
2 Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 331 (M.D. Ala. 1976). District Judge Frank
Johnson threatened to close any state prison which failed to comply with the minimum
constitutional standards set forth in his opinion.
3 See notes 213-41 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of the district jail
proposal.
Such an analysis already has been articulated. See Note, An Analysis of the
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Note will provide minimum constitutional guidelines for legis-
•lative reform. Beginning with a review of federal cases dealing
with federal constitutional attacks on physical conditions in
local jails, the discussion will focus on the constitutional
standards which have been fashioned by the federal courts in
that context. These standards will then be applied to the exist-
ing local jails in Kentucky in an attempt to determine roughly
their compliance with such constitutional requirements. Fi-
nally, this Note will consider the district jail proposal and how
it might provide an adequate solution to the fiscal problems of
cities and counties while preserving inmates' constitutional
guarantees.
I. THE ROLE OF FEDERAL COURTS IN STATE PRISON REFORM
A. From "Hands-Off" to Judicial Activism
Federal judicial activism in the area of state prison reform
is a relatively recent occurrence. Prior to 1964, federal courts
adhered to a "hands-off" policy in cases involving complaints
made by state prisoners,5 refusing to entertain most suits by
prisoners in state jails. Two primary justifications have been
offered for adherence to the policy. First, it has been argued
that the federal courts have no jurisdiction in these cases due
to preemption by state legislative and executive power., Sec-
ond, the complexity of the problems in the jails caused some
to suggest that it was better to vest the administrative chores
Question of County Jail Reform in Kentucky, 65 Ky. L.J. 130 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as County Jail Reform in Kentucky].
I See generally Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 522-23 (2d Cir. 1967); Inmates
of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 684 (D. Mass. 1973), aff'd,
494 F.2d 1196 (lst Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977 (1974); Haas, Judicial Politics
and Correctional Reform: An Analysis of the Doctrine of the "Hands-Off" Doctrine,
Dnr'. C.L. REv. 795 passim (1977) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Politics]; Comment,
Cruel But Not So Unusual Punishment: The Role of the Federal Judiciary in State
Prison Reform, 7 Cum. L.J. 31, 32-33 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Cruel But Not So
Unusual]; Comment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal
to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 Yale L.Rev. 506 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
Beyond the Ken of the Courts].
5 Judicial Politics, supra note 5, at 798-806; Comment, Inadequate Medical Treat-
ment of State Prisoners: Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 27 Am. U.L.R. 92,99 (1977);
Cruel But Not So Unusual, supra note 5, at 32-33.
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in those who were more familiar with the problems, rather than
in a judiciary which lacked expertise in penology.7
1. Demise of the Hands-Off Policy
The first indication that the Supreme Court might abandon
the traditional hands-off policy was demonstrated in the per
curiam decision of Cooper v. Pate.' The petitioner, an inmate
at the Illinois State Penitentiary, filed suit claiming that prison
officials had refused to allow him to purchase certain religious
material. The district court dismissed the suit for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and the Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 9 The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that, if true, the allegations contained in the
complaint stated a cause of action.'"
7 Judicial Politics, supra note 5, at 806-10; Comment, Inadequate Medical Treat-
ment of State Prisoners: Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, supra note 6, at 99-101. This
feeling was reflected in Mr. Justice Powell's majority opinion in Procunier v. Martinez,
416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974), when he wrote:
Traditionally, federal courts have adopted a broad hands-off attitude
toward problems of prison administration. In part this policy is the product
of various limitations on the scope of federal review of conditions in state
penal institutions. More fundamentally, this attitude springs from comple-
mentary perceptions about the nature of the problems and efficacy of judi-
cial intervention. Prison administrators are responsible for maintaining in-
ternal order and discipline, for securing their institutions against unauthor-
ized access or escape, and for rehabilitating, to the extent that human nature
and inadequate resources allow, the inmates placed in their custody. The
Herculean obstacles to effective discharge of these duties are too apparent
to warrant explication. Suffice it to say that the problems of prisons in
America are complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they are not
readily susceptible of resolution by decree. Most require expertise, compre-
hensive planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are pecu-
liarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of govern-
ment. For all of those reasons, courts are ill equipped to deal with the in-
creasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform. Judicial
recognition of that fact reflects no more than a healthy sense of realism.
Moreover, where state penal institutions are involved, federal courts have a
further reason for deference to the appropriate prison authorities.
8 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
9 324 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1963).
,1 The Supreme Court cited two cases, Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196 (4th Cir.
1961) and Pierce v. LaVallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2nd Cir. 1961). In both of these cases, suit
had been filed claiming that prison officials had interfered with the prisoners' religi-
ous practices. The respective district courts dismissed the complaints. Each circuit
court reversed and, by doing so, rejected the "hands-off" policy.
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The Cooper decision was followed by Lee v. Washington"
and Johnson v. Avery, 2 in which the Supreme Court invalida-
ted prison regulations which violated the prisoners' constitu-
tional rights. In these cases, the Supreme Court implied that
the hands-off doctrine would no longer preclude federal court
review of state prison matters which involved alleged violations
of the constitutional rights of prisoners. 13 This proposition was
supported by the case of Wolff v. McDonnell" in which Mr.
Justice White, writing for the majority, stated: "A prisoner is
not wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is
imprisoned for crime. There is no iron curtain drawn between
the Constitution and the prisons of this country."' 5
2. Civil Rights Protections: Fuel for Judicial Activism
Two Supreme Court decisions which liberally construed the
scope of civil rights protections hastened the decline of the
"hands-off" doctrine in the federal courts. The first of these
was Monroe v. Pape."6 In Monroe, the Court ruled that in ac-
tions based upon the Civil Rights Act of 1871 there is no need
" 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curiam).
n 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
1' In Lee, the jail's practice of segregating the prisoners according to race was
struck down. The Johnson Court invalidated a prison regulation which prohibited
inmates from helping other inmates to prepare writs or other legal papers.
1 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974). These decisions should not be construed to mean
that the Supreme Court has totally rejected the "hands-off' doctrine. Indeed, the
Court still allows great deference to prison officials. At least one writer has suggested
that the Supreme Court has obtained the same result under the "deference" policy as
it would have under the "hands-off" doctrine:
Through such deference, the Court has achieved a result that it could much
more easily and candidly have achieved had it simply declared that prisoners
are not entitled to constitutional protection. The Court has continued to
profess, however, that the Constitution does protect prisoners, and under
cover of that assertion, has permitted a hardy weed, the "hands-off" ap-
proach, to creep back into the prison yard from which it ostensibly had been
banished.
Emily Calhoun, The Supreme Court and the Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: A
Reappraisal, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 219, 220 (1977).
15 418 U.S. at 555.
Is 365 U.S. 167 (1961). In this case, a black family filed suit against the City of
Chicago and thirteen policemen, claiming that the policemen had violated their four-
teenth amendment rights by breaking into their house without a warrant and holding
them for questioning. The district court dismissed the case and the court of appeals
affirmed, 272 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1959). The Supreme Court reversed.
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to exhaust state remedies prior to seeking redress in federal
court. 7 The second of these civil rights precedents was Cooper
v. Pate, 18 in which the Court ruled that the Civil Rights Act of
1871 could be invoked to protect inmates of state prisons and
jails.'9
The significance of Monroe and Cooper should not be un-
derestimated. Prior to their decision, a prisoner being held in
a state prison could obtain relief in federal court only by filing
a writ of habeas corpus, a writ of mandamus or a civil action
in tort." The problems with using a habeas corpus action are
two fold. First, the writ is unavailable unless the prisoner has
exhausted all available state remedies or there is no adequate
state remedy.' This provision effectively postpones federal ju-
dicial review indefinitely since most states have statutory
schemes under which prisoners can pursue their constitutional
claims. However, as a general rule, state courts have not been
,1 365 U.S. at 183. "It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would
give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter
need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked." Id. This view
was reaffirmed in the 1963 case of McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668, 674
n.6 (1963), in which the Court quoted the following language from the case of Stapleton
v. Mitchell, 60 F. Supp. 51, 55 (D. Kan. 1945):
[W]e yet like to believe that wherever the Federal courts sit, human rights
under the federal Constitution are always a proper subject for adjudication,
and that we have not the right to decline the exercise of that jurisdiction
simply because the rights asserted may be adjudicated in some other forum.
378 U.S. 546 (1964)(per curiam).
, Id. (by implication).
20 See County Jail Reform in Kentucky, supra note 4, at 153-62.
21 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(c) (1948), which reads as follows:
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless
it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the
courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available State
corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process
ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies
available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he
has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure,
the question presented.
The reason for this requirement "is to avoid unnecessary friction between federal
and state courts which would result if a lower federal court overturned a state court
conviction without first giving the state court system an opportunity to correct its own
constitutional errors." Cruel But Not So Unusual, supra note 5, at 34-35 n.22, citing
as authority Presser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491-92 (1973).
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very sympathetic to such claims, as evidenced by the scarcity
of cases in which the state judiciary has ordered some type of
jail reform.?
Another shortcoming associated with federal habeas cor-
pus relief is that the kinds of relief are severely limited. For
example, where a federal judge finds that the conditions or
practices of the state jail are unconstitutional or unlawful, he
can order the release of the prisoner who brought the action.?
However, the judge cannot prohibit the existing conditions or
practices which precipitated the action .2 Therefore, although
a federal court may offer specific relief, it cannot effectuate
changes generally in the jail to protect the collective rights of
jail inmates.?
Both because of these problems inherent in habeas corpus
relief and due to the decisions in Monroe and Cooper, prisoners'
suits based on § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 187126 became
the most desirable method of attacking conditions of confine-
ment in state and local jails.? The advantages provided by a §
1983 action are significant. First of all, § 1983 is available in
class actions.? Thus, if a court makes a determination as to the
" Comment, State Prisoners and the Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies:
Section 1983 Jurisdiction and the Availability of Adequate State Remedies, 7 S-roN
HALL L. REV. 366, 382 (1976).
21 Id. at 383.
21 Comment, State Prisoners' Suits: Proper Forum, Choice of Remedy, and Effect
of Judgment, 51 TaX. L. REV. 1364, 1376-80 (1973).
2 The writ of habeas corpus is a personal remedy and thus cannot be used in a
class action. County Jail Reform in Kentucky, supra note 4, at 161-62. Thus, federal
courts can evaluate the conditions at local or state jails only upon a case by case
method. This factor, in addition to the exhaustion of state remedies requirement,
makes it clear why habeas corpus actions are an inefficient manner in which to initiate
jail reform.
21 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) reads as follows:
Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
2 See Remington, State Prisoner Litigation and the Federal Courts, 1974 Amiz. ST.
L.J. 549, 551 n.5, citing Din. Anm. OFF. U.S. CouRTS U.S. CounrS ANN. REP., IX-33
(prelim. ed. 1974). This report stated that some judges were spending up to 25% of their
time on prisoners' suits brought under § 1983. For further data on the number of suits
brought under § 1983, see Judicial Politics supra note 5, at 823-25.
21 Nearly all of the recent cases by prisoners challenging conditions or practices
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legality of the conditions of the jail, it affects all the members
of the class, which may consist of all jail inmates. Also, even if
the class representative's claim is mooted, the class suit may
usually continue.
29
Another advantage of the § 1983 action is its remedial
flexibility. If the physical conditions are deemed unconstitu-
tional, the court has several alternative means of relief in its
arsenal. For example, it can provide injunctive relief. 0 This
alternative is often the most effective since it has lasting conse-
quences. Through the use of injunctive remedies, a federal
court can require extensive changes in the conditions and prac-
tices of the jail.3 If the prison officials fail to adhere to the court
order, they can be sanctioned for contempt.1
2
in the jails have been class actions. See, e.g., Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873
(W.D.Mo. 1977), aff'd in part, modified in part, 570 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1978); Chapman
v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. 1007 (S.D. Ohio 1977); Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v.
Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1973), aff'd, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 977 (1974); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971),
order, 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub noma. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d
854 (6th Cir. 1972).
29 The Supreme Court, in Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402 (1975), held that a
"controversy may exist, however, between a named defendant and a member of the
class represented by the named plaintiff, even though the claim of the named plaintiff
has become moot." See also Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976). But
cf. White v. Keller, 438 F. Supp. 110 (D.Md. 1977), aff'd, 588 F.2d 913 (4th Cir.
1978) (controversy still existed after the claim of two named plaintiffs had become moot
only because the claim of a third named plaintiff remained in contention).
30 This type of relief is usually given together with a declaratory judgment for the
prisoners. The Court will first find that the prisoners' rights have been violated, then
order the jail officials to stop certain practices and/or take certain actions to protect
the prisoners' rights. See generally Cruel But Not So Unusual, supra note 5, at 40 n.63.
1, The nature of injunctions issued in each case differs in relation to the serious-
ness of the constitutional violation. Compare Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786
(M.D. Tenn. 1969)(court only ordered that the jail officials discontinue their use of a
dry cell) with Vest v. Lubbock Cty. Comm'rs. Court, 444 F. Supp. 824 (N.D. Tex.
1977) (court's opinion contained sixteen remedial provisions, requiring everything from
a reworked classification scheme to the installation of recreational facilities).
As a general rule, most cases involving jail conditions since 1970 have resulted in
extensive court-ordered relief, covering almost every aspect of jail operations. See
Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F. Supp. 886 (N.D. Fla. 1976); Campbell v. McGruder, 416
F. Supp. 100 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd in part and remanded, 580 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
See also Cruel But Not So Unusual, supra note 5, at 40 n.63; County Jail Reform in
Kentucky, supra note 4, at 165.
2 Cruel But Not So Unusual, supra note 5, at 40. The court will usually retain
jurisdiction over the case in order to ensure that the jail officials comply with their
order. See Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom.
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One of the more important remedial advantages of a § 1983
action is that a prisoner whose rights have been violated can
recover monetary damages from the jail officials.3 Such
awards, consisting of compensatory and punitive damages,
could become the most effective remedy available under §
1983. Surely local officials would be less likely to tolerate jails
which fail to meet constitutional standards if the threat of civil
penalty were present.3 4 Given the potential effectiveness of this
remedy, it is somewhat surprising that in most of the cases
involving claims by prisoners under § 1983, the federal courts
have refused to award monetary damages. 35
There are two major reasons for the hesitancy of federal
courts to award monetary damages in § 1983 actions. The most
significant impediment to such an award is that plaintiffs must
show that the officials acted in bad faith or with malice and
that the officials intentionally deprived the prisoners of their
constitutional rights. 6 Mere negligence is insufficient to sus-
tain such damages, even when jail conditions are horrendous.
An example of this may be seen in Jones v. Wittenberg.31 In
finding the condition of Lucas County Jail in Toledo, Ohio to
Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972). Some courts, in order to monitor
compliance with their order, have appointed a master to observe and report to the
court. Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956 (D. R.I. 1977). One court went so far
as to appoint an eighty-nine member Human Rights Committee to monitor compli-
ance. Puch v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 331 (M.D. Ala. 1976). The court of appeals later
reversed this part of the decision, saying that a less intrusive manner of monitoring
compliance would have been better. The court specifically stated that this monitoring
function should be turned over to a magistrate or a monitor. Newman v. Alabama, 559
F.2d 283, 289 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 915 (1977).
3 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
4 Note that state officials, if sued in their official capacity rather than individu-
ally, could not be held liable for monetary damages under § 1983 because of the
eleventh amendment. Comment, Inadequate Medical Treatment of State Prisoners:
Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, supra note 6, at 103 n.61. However, state officials
might be held personally liable if sued individually rather than in their official capac-
ity.
M This is not to say that monetary damages may not be awarded. For a list of some
of the cases which have awarded compensatory damages, see Cruel But Not So Unu-
sual, supra note 5, at 40 n.62.
1- Comment, Inadequate Medical Treatment of State Prisoners: Cruel and Unu-
sual Punishment?, supra note 6, at 103 n.61; County Jail Reform in Kentucky, supra
note 4.
11 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971), order, 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971),
aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
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be unconstitutional, the federal district judge wrote:
[W]hen the total picture of confinement in the Lucas
County Jail is examined, what appears is confinement in
cramped and overcrowded quarters, lightless, airless, damp
and filthy with leaking water and human wastes, slow starva-
tion, deprivation of most human contacts, except with others
in the same sub-human state, no exercise or recreation, little
if any medical attention, no attempt at rehabilitation, and
for those who in despair or frustration lash out at their sur-
roundings, confinement, stripped of clothing and every last
vestige of humanity, in a sort of oubliette."
Even with these horrifying conditions, the federal judge refused
to impose monetary damages, stating that there was no evi-
dence of any malice or ill will on the part of the officials."
The other obstacle to an award of monetary damages is the
common law doctrine of governmental or official immunity."
However, as more and more states reject the defense of immun-
ity,4 ' it will become less of a barrier to relief. Nevertheless,
those seeking damages under § 1983 will still have to contend
with the difficulty of proving bad faith or intent on the part of
the jail officials.
The final advantage of § 1983 actions over habeas corpus
relief is that prisoners need not exhaust state remedies before
Id. at 99.
Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones
v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972). A corollary is that many judges feel that it is
unfair to subject prison officials to personal liability when they are only doing what a
great number of people think should be done. Again, an excerpt from the Jones deci-
sion is enlightening:
It does not seem equitable to single out these defendants and mulct them in
damages for continuing practices which are commonplace, and of very an-
cient usage. Especially would it seem unjust to do so when it is clear that
up to at least a time shortly before this action was commenced, it was and
perhaps it still may be the desire of a majority of the electorate that the
county jail be an unpleasant and degrading, perhaps even a savagely cruel,
place to be. Should the servant be punished for not refusing to obey the
wishes of his master? At least in this case, this Court thinks not.
Id. at 722.
10 Comment, Inadequate Medical Treatment of State Prisoners: Cruel and Unu-
sual Punishment?, supra note 6, at 103 n.61; County Jail Reform in Kentucky, supra
note 4, at 165.
1, County Jail Reform in Kentucky, supra note 4, at 157.
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seeking relief in the federal courts. 2 As noted above, this re-
striction severely curtailed the number of instances in which
the federal judiciary could effectuate any reform in state pris-
ons and jails through habeas corpus petitions. This advantage,
probably more than any other factor, caused prisoners to turn
to § 1983 as the primary safeguard of their civil rights.
B. The Search for Standards Under the Eighth Amendment
A prisoner must prove that he has been deprived of his con-
stitutional rights to prevail in a suit under § 1983.11 Therefore,
a suit based upon prison conditions or practices must allege
and demonstrate constitutional violations." Most challenges to
the conditions of confinement have been grounded upon the
inmates' eighth amendment right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment.45 Accordingly, it is important to under-
stand the standards utilized by the federal courts to determine
whether or not the eighth amendment has been violated.
1. The Weems and Trop Standard
The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment did
not originate in the United States Constitution. Rather, this
prohibition "was taken directly from the English Declaration
of Rights of 1688, and the principle it represents can be traced
back to the Magna Carta."" It was originally thought that
42 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See Comment, The Maryland Inmate
Grievance Commission or the Federal Courts? A Problem of Exhaustion, 35 MD. L.
REv. 458 (1976). The Comment recognizes the rule of non-exhaustion under § 1983
actions, but argues that such exhaustion should be required where the state provides
adequate administrative remedies.
4 See note 26 supra for the text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
, It is of no consequence that the jail conditions and practices may seem "bad"
or even disgusting to the federal judge hearing the case. Unless the conditions or
practices are so unpalatable as to violate the Constitution, the federal courts are
powerless to intervene. See Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967); Note,
Decency and Fairness: An Emerging Judicial Role in Prison Reform, 57 VA. L. Rxv.
841, 850 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Decency and Fairness].
11 The eighth amendment reads: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor exces-
sive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII.
,5 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1957) (plurality opinion). For a more complete
and detailed historical analysis of the origin of the phrase "cruel and unusual punish-
ment," see Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original
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what constituted cruel and unusual punishment was deter-
mined by what acts were prohibited by the phrase when it was
first adopted in England." Under this standard, the amend-
ment prohibited only those kinds of punishment which were
"inherently cruel," such as those which involved torture."s If
this standard were still in effect, it would be of little use in
attacking physical conditions or practices of jails, for these
would pale when compared to the punishments which were
used in England long ago.49
This historical standard was discarded by the Court in
Weems v. United States." In Weems, a United States official
in the Phillipines was convicted, under Phillipine law, of falsi-
fying official records. His sentence provided for fifteen years of
cadena temporal.51 In determining whether this punishment
was prohibited by the cruel and unusual punishment clause,52
the Court discarded the borrowed historical meaning which
previously had been given to the amendment. The Court noted
that the Constitution cannot remain static, but rather must
acquire new meaning as the society grows and changes. Fur-
ther, the Court stated that the Constitution, and particularly
Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839 (1969). Granucci argues that those who included that
phrase in the United States Constitution misconstrued the phrase as it was used in
England. According to the American interpretation, the phrase prohibits cruel meth-
ods of punishment. However, in England, this phrase was not interpreted to prohibit
cruel methods of punishment but rather excessively harsh punishments.
11 Weems v. U.S., 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910).
48 Comment, Inadequate Medical Treatment of State Prisoners: Cruel and Unu-
sual Punishment?, supra note 6, at 96.
,1 This phrase did not prohibit certain practices in England which would be con-
sidered barbaric today. For example, the authorities were allowed to draw and quarter
the prisoner, to disembowel him or to burn him alive. Comment, The Eighth Amend-
ment and Prison Conditions: Shocking Standards and Good Faith, 44 FORDHA, L. Rv.
950, 952 n.15 (1976), quoting from 2 W. BLACKSTONE, CosrmmNTARms, BOOK IV, 376-77
(Cooley ed. 1899).
50 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
5, This phrase meant imprisonment at hard labor, with the prisoner being required
to "carry a chain at the ankle, and hanging from the wrists." Also, the prisoner lost
all civil rights during his imprisonment, lost all future political rights and was subject
to surveillance by the government for the rest of his life. Id. at 364.
52 It should be noted that the Court was interpreting this clause as it was used in
the Phillipine Bill of Rights. The Court said, however, that inasmuch as the phrase
was taken directly from the United States Constitution, the interpretation given to the
phrase in the Constitution would likewise be applicable to the phrase in the PhiUipine
Bill of Rights. Id. at 367.
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the eighth amendment, "is not fastened to the obsolete but
may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened
by a humane justice. 5 3 Applying this premise, the Court held
that the sentence in the case was so excessive as to violate the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 4
This flexible reading of the eighth amendment was pro-
pounded again by the Supreme Court in Trop v. Dulles,55 where
the petitioner had been court-martialed and convicted for
war-time desertion. As a result of conviction, the petitioner
was stripped of his U.S. citizenship pursuant to the Nationality
Act of 1940.1 The Court held that this punishment violated the
eighth amendment. The Court followed Weems, stating: "The
Court recognized in that case that the words of the Amendment
are not precise, and that their scope is not static. The Amend-
ment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."5 This
case is important not only because it firmly adopted the philos-
ophy of Weems, but also because it held that the eighth
amendment is applicable to any form of punishment, regard-
less of whether or not it involves actual physical mistreat-
ment."
"3 Id. at 378. In another portion of this opinion, the Court expounded on this theory
in greater detail:
Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from
an experience of evils, but its general language should not, therefore, be
necessarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time works
changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a
principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief
which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions. . . . In the
application of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of
what has been but of what may be. Under any other rule a constitution would
indeed be as easy of application as it would be deficient in efficacy and
power. Its general principles would have little value and be converted by
precedent into impotent and lifeless formulas. Rights declared in words
might be lost in reality.
Id. at 373.
Id. at 382.
356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion).
' Id. at 87.
5 Id. at 100-01.
' Id. at 101.
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2. Implementation of the Weems/Trop Standard: Three Tests
Using the principles fashioned in Weems and Trop, the fed-
eral judiciary began to apply the eighth amendment to state
and local prisons and jails.5" The major problem presented by
such application was the difficulty in dealing with individual
fact patterns. It was and is obvious that these "standards" were
really not standards at all. For instance, it is difficult to deter-
mine what constitutes the "evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society."'"0 It is even more
difficult to apply this platitude to particular jail conditions
and/or practices.
The federal courts have created three tests to implement
this broad language. The first and most popular is the "shock
the conscience" test,"' which provides that the punishment is
unconstitutional if it "is 'so foul, so inhuman and so violative
of basic concepts of decency' that it shocks the conscience of
the court."82 The greatest attribute of this test is flexibility;
0 3
the primary weakness is subjectivity. The constitutionality of
a practice or condition consequently rests upon the sensitivity
of the particular judge. 4 It has been observed that "[t]he word
'shocking' is one that essentially appeals to the emotions. Emo-
tional content added to imprecise concepts such as 'the evolv-
ing standards of decency' make measurement of a particular
situation almost impossible."65 Another problem is that the
test does not permit jail officials to anticipate what kind of
59 In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), the Supreme Court recognized
that the protections afforded by the eighth amendment are mandatory to each state
by way of the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment.
" Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
" This phrase was first utilized in Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970,972 (8th Cir. 1965).
'2 Robbins and Buser, Punitive Conditions of Prison Confinement: An Analysis of
Pugh v. Locke and Federal Court Supervision of State Penal Administration Under
the Eighth Amendment, 29 STAN. L. REv. 893, 902 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Punitive
Conditions], quoting from Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 526 (2d Cir. 1967); See
also Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970, 972 (8th Cir. 1965); Jordon v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp.
674, 679 (N.D. Cal., 1966).
" But see Punitive Conditions, supra note 62, at 902.
64 Robbins, Federalism, State Prison Reform, and Evolving Standards of Human
Decency: On Guessing, Stressing, and Redressing Constitutional Rights, 26 KAN. L.
REv. 551, 554-55 (1978).
"3 Comment, The Eighth Amendment and Prison Conditions: Shocking Stand-
ards and Good Faith, 44 FORDHAM L. Rav. 950, 959-60 (1976).
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conditions violate the constitution and which do not, thus mak-
ing it impossible to take corrective actions prior to litigation."
Under the second test created by the courts, the punish-
ment is deemed unconstitutional if it is "greatly dispropor-
tionate to the offense for which it was imposed."6 This test
follows the criterion utilized in Weems." To determine if the
punishment is excessive, however, it is necessary to apply the
"standards of decency" concept used in the first test.6 Accord-
ingly, a certain degree of subjective evaluation is also included
in the second test.
The final test is a combination of the first two. It requires
constitutional invalidation if "although applied in pursuit of a
legitimate penal aim, it [the punishment] goes beyond what
is necessary to achieve that aim; that is, when a punishment
is unnecessarily cruel in view of the purpose for which it is
used."7 This test, like the other two, requires subjective con-
siderations and provides little more predictive guidance to the
corrections system.
Most of the earlier cases in which the above tests were
utilized involved attacks on methods of prison discipline." Al-
though these tests had inherent weaknesses, they worked well
when applied to instances involving prison discipline. This re-
sult is not unusual because prison discipline is undoubtedly a
form of punishment in the classical sense for which these tests
were promulgated.7 2 Therefore, the only determination to be
"s Punitive Conditions, supra note 62, at 903.
,1 Jordon v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674, 679 (N.D. Cal. 1966). See also Punitive
Conditions, supra note 62, at 903; Note, supra note 45, at 849.
Is See notes 50-54 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of the Weems
decision.
" Decency and Fairness, supra note 44, at 849.
70 Jordon v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674, 679 (N.D. Cal. 1966). See also Punitive
Conditions, supra note 62, at 904-06; Decency and Fairness, supra note 44 at 849.
7' Comment, Inadequate Medical Treatment of State Prisoners: Cruel and Unu-
sual Punishment?, supra note 6, at 104-06. By far the majority of these cases involved
attacks on solitary confinement as a means of prison discipline. Id. at 105 n.67. See,
e.g., Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969); Jordon v. Fitzharris, 257
F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
72 See Note, Constitutional Law-Eighth Amendment-Cumulative Impact of
Deplorable Conditions of Confinement in State Prison Constitutes Cruel and Unusual
Punishment, Even Though Inmates Were Subjected Incidentally Rather Than in De-
liberate Retribution for Criminal Conduct, 23 ALA. L. REv. 143, 148-49 (1970).
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made was whether the punishment was shocking, excessive, or
went beyond the pursuit of a legitimate penal aim.73
These tests, however, became meaningless when applied
to challenge physical conditions of confinement. For example,
it is easy to agree that the conditions described in Jones v.
Wittenberg" were indeed "shocking" to the conscience of the
court." However, would those conditions have been considered
unconstitutional if all of the conditions except overcrowding
had been present? Would the overcrowding itself have been
sufficient to "shock" the court's conscience? This illustrates
the difficulty in applying the three traditional tests described
above to cases challenging jail conditions. These tests simply
are not precise enough to benefit either the federal judiciary or
state and local corrections systems.76
3. "Totality of the Conditions" Test
Because of the inherent inadequacies of the three traditional
tests, the federal courts began to search for a new standard to
guide them in applying the eighth amendment to prison and
jail conditions. The test which more and more federal courts
have begun to favor may be described as the "totality of the
conditions" test. The case of Holt v. Sarver" is credited with
being the first case to employ this test.
Holt involved a challenge of the conditions and practices
in the facilities of the Arkansas State Penitentiary System.'
The Court began its analysis of the prisoners' eighth amend-
ment claims by stating that the conditions of confinement by
themselves may violate the eighth amendment even absent any
11 See notes 61-70 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of these three
tests.
11 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971), order, 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971),
aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
"' See text accompanying note 38 supra for a description of the conditions at the
Lucas County Jail in Toledo, Ohio.
76 One writer has noted that these tests, despite their deficiencies, have been
utilized by several courts in cases involving attacks on prison conditions. Punitive
Conditions, supra note 62, at 906, citing, among others: Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97 (1976); Kish v. County of Milwaukee, 441 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1971); Landman v.
Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971), order, 354 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Va. 1973).
7 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), affl'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
78 Id. at 364-66.
[Vol. 68
1979-801 COUNTY JAIL REFORM IN KENTUCKY
disciplinary action." In determining the constitutionality of
the prison conditions, the Court considered all of the conditions
in their totality rather than analyzing each condition sepa-
rately. The Court reasoned as follows:
The distinguishing aspects of Arkansas penitentiary life
must be considered together. One cannot consider separately
a trusty system, a system in which men are confined together
in large numbers in open barracks, bad conditions in the
isolation cells, or an absence of a meaningful program of reha-
bilitation. All of those things exist in combination; each af-
fects the other; and taken together they have a cumulative
impact on the inmates regardless of their status."0
The conditions which the Court considered in its eighth
amendment analysis included the use of a trusty system,8' the
use of open-barrack sleeping arrangements, 2 understaffing, 83
the lack of a rehabilitation program,8 inadequate medical and
dental care," lack of sanitation86 and the lack of concern for the
prisoners' personal hygiene. 87 Based upon the totality of these
11 Id. at 372-73. This is significant because in most of the cases decided prior to
Holt, courts had deemed jail conditions violative of the eighth amendment only when
they were considered in conjunction with some type of disciplinary action, usually
solitary confinement. See note 71 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of this
transition in protection of inmates' constitutional rights.
'0 309 F. Supp. at 373.
" Id. at 373-76. Under the trusty system, certain prisoners were selected to per-
form many administrative functions in the prison, including guarding the other in-
mates. The court condemned this system, saying:
[Ilt creates an unhealthy prison climate and atmosphere; it breeds fear and
hatred between the guards, on the one hand, and those guarded, on the other
hand; it tends to be brutal and to endanger the lives of the inmates who live
and work "under the guns" of other convicts; and it leads to other abuses.
Id. at 373.
" Id. at 376-78. The open barracks arrangement was condemned because it en-
couraged sexual assaults and violence among the prisoners.
13 Id. at 373. One prison in the Arkansas system housed 1000 men, yet the prison
employed only 35 "free world" people. Only eight of these worked guard duty, and only
two were on duty at night. Id.
11 Id. at 378-79. The court noted that the absence of a rehabilitation program is
not per se unconstitutional. However, it is a factor to be considered in the totality of
the circumstances.
"Id. at 380.
8 Id.
"Id. The prisoners had no towels, insufficient socks and underclothing, and un-
clean bedding.
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conditions, the Court held that the Arkansas Prison System
violated the prisoners' eighth amendment rights"5 as protected
from "state action" by the fourteenth amendment.
Although the Holt Court was the first to employ the total-
ity test, its example proved to be of little help to other courts
dealing with similar cases. As two commentators observed,
"the extreme factual situation [in Holt] qualified its value for
subsequent litigation by removing the necessity of discussing
minimum constitutional standards. Moreover, the court's prin-
ciple reliance upon two particularly grievous conditions [(the
trusty system and open barracks)] limited its precedential
value in cases involving relatively more typical prison condi-
tions."89
Jones v. Wittenberg" was the first decision in which the
totality of the conditions test was applied in such a way as to
create minimum constitutional standards for jail conditions.'
The court carefully analyzed every aspect of the Lucas County
Jail, Toledo, Ohio, ranging from its food service to its physical
facilities. Unlike Holt, the court in Jones was not faced with
the problems generated by the trusty system and the open
barracks." Rather, the court was more concerned with condi-
Id. at 381.
, Punitive Conditions, supra note 62, at 907.
g 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971), order, 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971),
aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
11 Many writers have identified Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976),
aff'd and remanded sub nom. Newman v. Alabama 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1977), as the first case to adequately utilize the totality of the
conditions test. See Robbins, Federalism, State Prison Reform, and Evolving Stan-
dards of Human Decency: On Guessing, Stressing, and Redressing Constitutional
Rights, supra note 64, at 556; Punitive Conditions, supra note 62, at 907. However, a
close reading of Pugh and Jones reveals that both courts identified nearly the same
conditions which caused the jail or prison to be declared unconstitutional. Jones,
however, was decided five years earlier than Pugh. The only difference between the
two cases is the fact that the jail in Jones housed some pretrial detainees. 323 F. Supp.
at 96 (three-fourths of the inmates were unconvicted detainees). However, the court
in Jones analyzed the conditions according to the standards under the eighth amend-
ment, saying that if the jail's conditions inflicted cruel and unusual punishment upon
the convicted inmates, then the detainees' due process rights under the fourteenth
amendment were violated. Id. at 99-100.
,1 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971), order, 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971),
aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972). Rather, the court in
Jones faced more prevalant problems such as overcrowding, deteriorating physical
facilities, lack of medical facilities and inadequate sanitation, among others. Id.
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tions which are not uncommon to many local jails existing in
Kentucky and other states. By analyzing the standards set
forth in Jones and other federal cases which followed, it is
possible to identify the factors courts consider and their respec-
tive importance in determining the validity of eighth amend-
ment claims. State and local correctional officials as well as
inmates may evaluate the boundaries of the protection of the
eighth amendment by scrutinizing these significant criterion.
C. Identification of Factors in the "Totality of Conditions"
Test
1. Overcrowding
Overcrowding is one factor which many courts have consid-
ered in determining if the conditions of the jail constitute cruel
and unusual punishment."3 Overcrowding in jails is almost uni-
versally condemned for a number of reasons. First, it often
deprives the prisoner of any semblance of privacy. 4 Second, it
can result in an increase of prisoner violence since the prisoners
are crowded into a closer proximity with each other. 5 Finally,
it often overtaxes the limited resources of the jail. 8
In determining if the jail is overcrowded, the courts have
examined several considerations. Often the jail will house more
prisoners than it was originally constructed to hold. This fac-
11 See Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873, 889-90 (W.D.Mo. 1977), aff'd in part,
modified in part, 570 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1978); Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. 1007,
1020-21 (S.D. Ohio 1977); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 325 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd
sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915
(1977); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 96 (N.D. Ohio 1971), order, 330 F. Supp.
707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
11 Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 873-74 (M.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd in part,
modified in part, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977). Although the prisoner has no constitu-
tional right to privacy, Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. 1007, 1020 (S.D. Ohio 1977),
privacy is one of the factors which courts consider in determining if constitutional
violations exist. See Miller, 401 F. Supp. at 874.
11 Overcrowding, as well as the use of open barracks, was cited as a factor contrib-
uting to the pervasiveness of violence in the Arkansas prison system. Holt v. Sarver,
309 F. Supp. 362, 376-77 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
11 Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 324-26 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd sub nom.
Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 438 U.S. 915 (1977) (over-
crowding disrupted the prison's classification system and limited access to the prison's
few rehabilitative programs).
7 Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 873 (N.D. Fla. 1975) (jail designed to hold
432 prisoners was holding 600 or more); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 96 (N.D.
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tor seems to weigh heavily in the courts' deliberation." Another
factor which the courts have considered is the number of square
feet allowed per prisoner." Although it is not clear what mini-
mum space is allowable, most authorities state that there
should be between fifty and seventy-five square feet minimum
for each prisoner."" Clearly, any jail which provides less than
fifty square feet per prisoner would be subject to close scrutiny.
2. Understaffing
A corollary to the problem of overcrowding is that of under-
staffing in the jail.'0 ' There are several problems associated
with understaffing. First and foremost is the fact that the pris-
oners' safety cannot be protected without an adequate staff."2
Absent adequate backup personnel, guards rarely enter the cell
blocks and thus there is little protection against assaults by
other prisoners.0 3 Also, as a result of inadequate staffing, a
prisoner in need of medical assistance may be required to wait
several hours until there is a sufficient backup crew to allow the
guards to enter the cell.' 4
Ohio 1971); order, 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger,
456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972) (jail designed to hold 150 prisoners held an average of 200
prisoners, and at one time held 272).
,' See citations listed in note 97 supra.
Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. 1007, 1020-21 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
,o Id. at 1021. It should be noted that the Supreme Court has stated that while
the figures cited by these authorities are instructive, they do not set the minimum
space allowable under the Constitution. Bell v. Wolfish, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 1876 n.27
(1979).
101 Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873, 894 (W.D.Mo. 1977), aff'd in part, modi-
fied in part, 570 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1978); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 325 (M.D.
Ala. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
438 U.S. 915 (1977); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 97 (N.D. Ohio 1971), order,
330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th
Cir. 1972); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 373 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
102 Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873, 894 (W.D.Mo. 1977), aff'd in part, modi-
fied in part, 570 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1978). Due to understaffing, there was inadequate
control over the prisoners, resulting in fights causing serious injuries to the prisoners.
,03 Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 325 (M.D.Ala. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Newman
v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1977).
"I Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873, 894 (W.D. Mo. 1977), aff'd in part,
modified in part, 570 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1978).
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3. Physical Facilities
Most jails which have been the subject of prisoners' suits
were very old when the suits were initiated. A good example
was the jail in Jones v. Wittenburg, which was built in the
1890's. 111 Because of their age, many of the jails have substand-
ard physical facilities which almost all of the courts have cited
as being a major factor in determining the constitutional com-
pliance of a jail."6 It is clear from Jones and subsequent cases
that courts are very critical of jails which: (1) provide little or
no lighting inside the jail cell;0 7 (2) have inadequate cooling in
the summer and heating in the winter, as well as inferior over-
all ventilation;' 5 (3) have plumbing and electrical wiring which
"1 323 F. Supp. 93, 95 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d
854 (6th Cir. 1972). Cf. Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873, 881 (W.D. Mo. 1977),
aff'd in part, modified in part, 570 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1978) (jail was built in 1867 and
restored in 1887); Inmates of the Suffolk Co. Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 679
(D. Mass. 1973), aff'd, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977 (1974) (jail
in continuous use since 1848).
'1 Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873, 891-92 (W.D. Mo. 1977), aff'd in part,
modified in part, 570 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1978) (inadequate plumbing, heating, lighting
and no automated ventilation); Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 869, 871-72 (M.D.
Fla. 1975), aff'd in part, modified in part, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977) (bad lighting,
plumbing and ventilation; inadequate and often inoperable showers, commodes, and
laundry facilities; no sprinkling system or evacuation plan); Inmates of the Suffolk Co.
Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 679-80 (D. Mass. 1973), affl'd, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977 (1974) (insufficient heat, plumbing and electrical
wiring; no fire escape); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 95-96 (N.D. Ohio 1971),
aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972)(poor lighting, ventilation,
plumbing; broken windows).
"I Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707, 715, 721 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub
nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972). As part of its remedy, the court
in Jones ruled that each cell must have an overhead light fixture with "sufficient foot-
candles in each cell to permit the reading of a newspaper according to applicable
standards." Id. at 715. Similarly, in Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873, 902 (W.D.
Mo. 1977), aff'd in part, modified in part, 570 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1978), the district
court established minimum standards for the new county jail which was being built
to replace the jail which was the subject of the suit. One of the standards established
by the court required the new facility to have "adequate lighting." Id. The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals omitted these specific standards from the order and judg-
ment, saying that it was inappropriate for the court to fix standards for a jail not yet
in existence. However, the court warned that the standards were sound and that every
effort should be made to comply fully with them in order to preclude possible future
constitutional attacks. 570 F.2d at 290.
'" Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873, 891 (W.D. Mo. 1977), aff'd in part,
modified in part, 570 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1978); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 334
(M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.), cert.
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are in disrepair and which do not comply with the applicable
building and housing codes;"0 9 (4) have an insufficient number
of working showers and commodes to adequately serve the in-
mate population;110 or (5) have no sprinkler or alarm system to
guard against possible fires and which have no workable evacu-
ation plan to be used during emergencies.'
4. Sanitation and Personal Hygiene
Closely associated with conditions of overcrowding and anti-
quated physical facilites is the problem of sanitation and per-
sonal hygiene of the inmates.112 Usually, this factor is precipi-
tated by the presence of these other two difficulties. In deter-
mining if a jail is unsanitary, the courts usually consider
whether: (1) the plumbing is inadequate so as to cause water
denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1977); Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 872 (M.D. Fla. 1975),
aff'd in part, modified in part, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977); Jones v. Wittenberg, 330
F. Supp 707, 721 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th
Cir. 1972).
20I Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873, 901-02 (W.D. Mo. 1977), aff'd in part,
modified in part, 570 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1978); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 334
(M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1977); Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 871 (M.D.Fla. 1975),
aff'd in part, modified in part, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977); Jones v. Wittenberg, 330
F. Supp. 707, 721 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th
Cir. 1972).
,10 Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 334 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd sub noma. Newman
v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1977)(the district court
ordered that there be "one toilet per 15 inmates, one urinal or one foot of urinal per 15
inmates, one shower per 20 inmates, and one lavatory per 10 inmates"); Jones v.
Wittenberg 330 F. Supp. 707, 721 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger,
456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
'" Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873, 891 (W.D. Mo. 1977), aff'd in part,
modified in part, 570 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1978); Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 872
(M.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd in part, modified in part, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977); Inmates
of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 680 (D. Mass. 1973) aff'd,
494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977 (1974).
2" Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873, 890-91 (W.D. Mo. 1977), aff'd in part,
modified in part, 570 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1978); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp.
956, 987 (D.R.I. 1977); Vest v. Lubboch County Comm'rs Court, 444 F. Supp. 824, 828
(D.C. Tex. 1977); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 323-24 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd sub
nofa. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1977);
Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F. Supp. 886, 889-90 (N.D. Fla. 1976); Alberti v. Sheriff of
Harris Cty., 406 F. Supp. 649, 677 (S.D. Tex. 1975); Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp.
835, 870-72 (M.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd in part, modified in part, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir.
1977); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 95-96 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom.
Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
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and sewage to leak into the jail;113 (2) the jail appears filthy;114
and (3) roaches, mice and rats are present.1 Concerning the
personal hygiene of the prisoners, the courts consider whether
the prisoners are: (1) provided items such as a comb, tooth-
brush, razor blade and clean towels and washcloths;"' (2) al-
lowed to bathe or shower on a regular basis; '17 (3) furnished
"I Vest v. Lubboch County Comm'rs Court, 444 F. Supp. 824, 830 (N.D. Tex.
1977)(cross connections between water and sewer often resulted in the sewage entering
into the water supply); Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F. Supp. 886, 889 (N.D. Fla.
1976)(unclogging toilets and showers were left up to the ingenuity of the inmates);
Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 323 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Newman v.
Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1977)(there was one
functioning toilet for 200 men); Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 871 (M.D. Fla.
1975), aff'd in part, modified in part, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977)(commodes and
water supply often malfunctioned); Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt,
360 F. Supp. 676, 680-81 (D. Mass. 1973), aff'd, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 977 (1974)(sewage pipes leaked, causing some portions of the jail to flood
and raw sewage leaked from ceiling pipes in the kitchen); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323
F. Supp. 93, 96 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub noam. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854
(6th Cir. 1972)(sewage pipes leaked causing raw sewage to run onto the floor).
"I Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 323 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Newman
v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1977)("In general,
Alabama's penal institutions are filthy."); Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisen-
stadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 680 (D. Mass. 1973), aff'd, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 977 (1974)("Toilets and sinks in the cells are corroded, filth encrusted
and often a serious health hazard.").
"I Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873, 891 (W.D. Mo. 1977), aff'd in part,
modified in part, 570 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1978); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 323
(M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1977); Miller v. Carson 401 F. Supp. 835, 871-72 (M.D. Fla.
1975), aff'd in part modified in part, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977). The rodent problem
in Miller was so bad that the inmates sometimes passed their idle time trapping mice
and rats. There was also evidence of rat and cockroach excretia in the kitchen and
officer dining room areas located on the first floor of the jail. Id. Another jail exhibiting
these problems was the Suffolk jail in Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt,
360 F. Supp. 676, 680 (D. Mass. 1973), aff'd, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 977 (1974).
Ie Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873, 902 (W.D. Mo. 1977), aff'd in part,
modified in part, 570 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1978)(towels, washcloths, toothbrushes and
soap must be provided); Vest v. Lubboch County Comm'rs Court, 444 F. Supp. 824,
828 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (prisoners required to go for weeks with no clean towels); Mitchell
v. Untreiner, 421 F. Supp. 886, 889 (N.D. Fla. 1976)(hygienic items available only for
sale); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 323 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Newman
v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1977)(prisoners sup-
plied only with razor blades and soap); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 96 (N.D.
Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972)(shaving
materials furnished only twice a week).
M Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp 835, 871 (M.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd in part, modified
in part, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977). In Miller, there was only one shower per cellblock,
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with an adequate supply of clean clothing;1 8 and provided with
clean bedding (mattress and sheets)."'
5. Medical Facilities
Inadequate medical facilities are a contributing factor in
nearly all cases involving constitutional attacks on jail condi-
tions.20 Unlike the above conditions, however, inadequate pro-
vision of medical care has been addressed by the Supreme
Court in the eighth amendment context. In Estelle v.
Gamble, 12, an inmate held by the Texas Department of Correc-
tions brought suit alleging that his eighth amendment rights
had been violated when the prison officials had failed to ade-
quately treat his back injury. 22 The inmate was seen "by medi-
cal personnel on 17 occasions spanning a three month period
. . .," and was treated for lIwer back sprain.m The Supreme
Court held that the inmate's claim of inadequate medical
treatment was insufficient to support his claim under the
eighth amendment. 24 Justice Marshall, writing for the major-
which sometimes contained as many as 24 prisoners and those in isolation were not
allowed to shower for a period of up to two weeks.
,,I Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873, 891 (W.D. Mo. 1977), aff'd in part,
modified in part, 570 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1978) (neither clothing nor facilities other than
sinks to wash clothes provided); Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F. Supp. 886, 889 (N.D.
Fla. 1976)(clothing not provided to indigent inmates); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F.
Supp. 93, 96 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir.
1972) (only a few prisoners furnished clothing and there were no available facilities for
washing clothes).
"I Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp 873, 890-91 (W.D. Mo. 1977), aff'd in part,
modified in part, 570 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1978)(mattresses, sheets, pillow cases and
blankets were filthy and blankets were not disinfected when washed); Vest v. Lubboch
County Comm'rs Court, 444 F. Supp. 824, 828 (N.D. Tex. 1977)(prisoners went for
months without being furnished clean blankets, and weeks without clean sheets; mat-
tresses were unfit for human use); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 96 (N.D. Ohio
1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972) (mattresses consis-
ted of a one and one-half inch thick piece of foam rubber; one blanket was issued to
each prisoner, and it was sometimes not washed before issuance).
121 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F. Supp. 886, 890-91 (N.D. Fla. 1976);
Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 876-79 (M.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd in part, modified in
part, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp 93, 97 (N.D. Ohio
1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
121 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
2 Id. at 99-101.
123 Id. at 107.
212 Id. at 107-08.
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ity, formulated the following test to determine the constitu-
tionality of medical service to prisoners: "In order to state a
cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions suffi-
ciently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs. It is only such indifference that can offend
'evolving standards of decency' in violation of the Eighth
Amendment."'2
In most lower court cases in which medical treatment has
been a factor, the circumstances have been significantly differ-
ent than those described in Estelle. In Estelle, the claim in-
volved inadequate medical treatment. In the other cases, the
claim has usually involved inadequate facilities as well as inad-
equate treatment.2 1 Therefore, Estelle arguably does not con-
trol where inadequate facilites also are involved. 17
Most courts have noted two deficiences when analyzing
medical facilities in jails. The most important of these deficien-
cies is the lack of adequate medical facilities inside the jail. In
some cases, the jail had no medical facilities.128 In such in-
stances, medical examination and treatment were provided
inside the prisoner's cell or outside the jail. 121 In those jails
providing separate medical facilities, they were so small and
under-equipped that they were described as "primitive," 3 ' or
'" Id. at 106.
325 See citations listed in note 120 supra for some cases involving inadequate
medical facilities.
'2 See Neisser, Is There a Doctor in the Joint? The Search for Constitutional
Standards for Prison Health Care, 63 VA. L. REv. 921, 933-36 (1977).
However, the test formulated in Estelle is still utilized in all instances in which
the medical treatment provided by jails is attacked under the eighth amendment. In
cases alleging inadequate medical facilities, courts have applied the Estelle test in a
manner similar to the following:
An individual seeking relief must prove "deliberate indifference to a pris-
oner's serious illness or injury,". . . In the case of a class action challenging
the entire system of medical care delivery, "deliberate indifference" can be
shown . . . by evidence that "the medical facilities [are] so wholly inade-
quate for the prison population's needs that suffering would be inevitable."
Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 983-84 (D.R.I. 1977). Thus, courts have been
able to adapt the Estelle test to cases involving inadequate medical facilities. See also
Martinez Rodriguez v. Jimenez, 409 F. Supp. 582, 594 (D. Puerto Rico, 1976), which
used a test similar to Palmigiano, but was decided prior to Estelle.
"I Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873, 892 (W.D.Mo. 1977), aff'd in part, modi-
fied in part, 570 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1978); Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F. Supp. 886, 890
(N.D. Fla. 1976).
"I See citations listed in note 128 supra for instances in which medical examina-
tions had to be done either in the prisoner's cell or just outside of the jail.
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at least inadequate to meet the needs of a growing jail popula-
tion. 131
Even if the facilities themselves are adequate, the medical
services may be deemed deficient because of the lack of an
adequate medical staff. In many instances, jails neither employ
doctors and dentists on a full time basis nor have them avail-
able for call at all times. Rather, they merely visit the jail
periodically to treat the prisoners.' 3 The part-time treatment
of inmates has caused several problems. First, it meant that
medical care will not always be available. In case of emergen-
cies, crucial decisions have been left to non-medical person-
nel.'3 3 Second, it meant that often there were no medical per-
sonnel to supervise the distribution and consumption of pre-
scribed medicines.'
34
As a result of inadequate facilities and staffing, most jails
which were the subject of prisoners' suits had been unable to
provide physical examinations for incoming prisoners. This
inadequacy has been condemned by most courts.'35 The reason
' Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 97 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones
v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
's, Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 202-03' (8th Cir. 1974).
V3 est v. Lubboch County Comm'rs Court, 444 F. Supp. 824, 830 (N.D. Tex.
1977) (doctor was scheduled to visit the jail twice a week but often came only once a
week); Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 876 (M.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd in part, modified
in part, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977)(medical staff consisted of a physician who was
available one-half day per week and four registered nurses who were off duty from
eleven o'clock p.m. to seven o'clock a.m. on weekdays and four o'clock p.m. to seven
o'clock a.m. on weekends); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 97 (N.D. Ohio 1971),
aff'd sub noma. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972)(physician came to the
jail two or three afternoons a week).
' Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 876 (M.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd inpart, modified
in part, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977). The court also noted that even in situations
involving non-emergency medical needs, the prisoner was dependent upon a non-
medical correctional staff to deliver his request to a doctor or other medical assistant.
Id. See Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873, 892-93 (W.D. Mo. 1977), aff'd in part,
modified in part, 570 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1978).
,"I Vest v. Lubboch County Comm'rs Court, 444 F. Supp. 824, 831 (N.D. Tex.
1977).
"I Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873, 902 (W.D. Mo. 1977), aff'd in part,
modified in part, 570 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1978); Vest v. Lubboch County Comm'rs
Court, 444 F. Supp. 824, 830-31 (N.D. Tex. 1977); Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F. Supp.
886, 890 (N.D. Fla. 1976); Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 878 (M.D. Fla. 1975),
aff'd in part, modified in part, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977); Inmates of the Suffolk
County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 689 (D. Mass. 1973), affl'd, 494 F.2d 1196
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977 (1974).
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for this initial examination is to prevent the spread of commun-
icable diseases carried by a new inmate. 3
6. Classification
Lack of an adequate classification system for prisoners has
been cited by many courts in ruling jail conditions to be uncon-
stitutional."7 In most instances there was no classification
other than between sexes and between juveniles and older of-
fender. 138 For example, in the Duval County Jail in Jackson-
ville, Florida, the only classification other than that of sex was
based on race.'3' Failure to classify inmates has been criticized
because: (1) it does not separate pretrial detainees from con-
victed inmates; 4" (2) it fails to separate the violent inmates
from the weaker ones and thus the weaker ones are subject to
violence, extortion and sexual assault;' and, (3) it does not
allow those with emotional and physical disabilities to receive
the care that they need."
2
"I' In Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873, 892 (W.D. Mo. 1977), aff'd in part,
modified in part, 570 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1978), the jail's failure to provide an initial
examination caused the entire jail population to be exposed to hepatitis. See Gates v.
Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1300 (5th Cir. 1974); Vest v. Lubboch County Comm'rs Court,
444 F. Supp. 824, 837 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
"I See, e.g., Vest v. Lubboch County Comm'rs Court, 444 F. Supp 824, 829 (N.D.
Tex. 1977); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 324 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd sub nom.
Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1977); Jones
v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 97 (N.D. Ohio 1971), affd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger,
456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
" In some cases, even this separation was not adequately maintained. For in-
stance, in Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873, 895 (W.D. Mo. 1977), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 570 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1978), the cells were situated in such a way as to
allow male prisoners, visitors and guards a complete view of the juveniles' and women's
cells. In Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 874 (M.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd in part,
modified in part, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977), separation was not maintained between
juveniles and adult felony offenders. This situation resulted in an adult prisoner's rape
of a juvenile.
"I' Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 874 (M.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd inpart, modified
in part, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977).
"I Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873, 895 (W.D. Mo. 1977), aff'd in part,
modified in part, 570 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1978); Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707,
717 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
See also Judge Frank M. Johnson, Observation: The Constitution and the Federal
District Judge, 54 TEx. L.REv. 903, 913 (1976).
" Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 324 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Newman
v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1977).
"I See citations appearing in note 141 supra for an exposition of this problem.
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7. Recreation, Education and Work
A jail's failure to provide adequate exercise or recreational
facilities, or any educational or work opportunities has been
considered important by the courts."' The supporting rationale
is that it is cruel to require prisoners to remain idle during the
entire period of incarceration. The significance of this factor is
demonstrated by the words of Judge Bohanon in Battle v.
Anderson:'44
Where inmates are confined to their cells for periods up to
one year and subjected to continual and enforced idleness
without affording them any opportunities for physical exer-
cise, voluntary work, or educational programs, it must be
concluded that such conditions of confinement constitute
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. '45
Even if some indoor recreational facilities are available, courts
have been critical of the fact that the prisoners are not allowed
to be outside in the sunlight."'
The federal courts of appeals have been less concerned
with this factor than have the federal district courts. Most
circuit courts have held that there is no absolute right to reha-
bilitation (exercise and vocational and educational training).'47
In McCray v. Sullivan,4 ' the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled that the failure to provide rehabilitation programs for
prisoners did not by itself violate the eighth amendment.' In
Newman v. State of Alabama,' the Fifth Circuit reiterated its
"I See, e.g., Martinez Rodriguez v. Jimenez, 409 F. Supp. 582, 594 (D. Puerto Rico
1976)(failure to provide reasonably adequate facilities); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp.
318, 329 (M.D. Ala. 1976), affd sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1977) (no opportunities for exercise or recreation); Jones v.
Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 97 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger,
456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
'" 376 F. Supp. 402 (E.D. Okla. 1974), aff'd, 564 F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 1977).
'"Id. at 424.
4 Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 881-82 (M.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd in part,
modified in part, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977). As a part of its remedy, the court
required that the jail provide some type of outdoor recreation. Id.
"I See generally J. PALMER, CONSTrrUTONAL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 152-53 (2d ed.
1977).
"' 509 F.2d 332 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 159 (1975).
"4 Id. at 335.
1' 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1977).
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position on rehabilitation requirements by stating:
The mental, physical, and emotional status of individuals,
whether in custody or not, do deteriorate and there is no
power on earth to prevent it. . . . If the State furnishes its
prisoners with reasonably adequate food, clothing, shelter,
sanitation, medical care, and personal safety, so as to avoid
the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment, that ends
its obligation under Amendment Eight.15" '
The view taken by the Fifth Circuit, however, should be
contrasted with that of the Eighth Circuit. In Finney v. Arkan-
sas Board of Correction, 52 the court ruled that the lack of reha-
bilitation programs should be a factor in determining if the
eighth amendment had been violated: "In Holt II, the district
court said that the lack of rehabilitative programs could, in the
face of 'other conditions,' be violative of the Eighth Amend-
ment. With this we agree." '153 It appears, therefore, that even
if there is no constitutional right to rehabilitation, it may be a
factor for consideration under the totality of the conditions
test.
8. Food
Inadequate food and food service also may be considered in
determining the constitutional compliance of jails. Several as-
pects of food services programs have warranted criticism.
Many cases have focused on the fact that the food fails to
provide a minimum nutritional requirement.'54 Others point
"I Id. at 291. It is interesting to note that although the Fifth Circuit ruled that a
lack of rehabilitative services should not be considered, it upheld the district court's
ruling requiring reasonable recreational facilities at the jail, saying that they did so
"because such facilities may play an important role in extirpating the effects of the
conditions which undisputably prevailed in these prisons at the time the District Court
entered its order." Id. It also upheld the district court's order that each prisoner shall
be assigned a meaningful job, stating that such an order would not burden the jail
officials. However, the court noted that this element was not constitutionally man-
dated, and that it should have no precedential value in future cases. Id. at 292.
152 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974).
'1 Id. at 209. See also French v. Heyne, 547 F.2d 994, 1002 (7th Cir. 1976); Palmi-
giano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 981 (D.R.I. 1977).
"I' Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873, 893 (W.D. Mo. 1977), aff'd in part,
modified in part, 570 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1978); Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 879-
80 (M.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd in part, modified in part, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977); Jones
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out the fact that the food is stored and prepared in an unsani-
tary manner.'55 Courts also have recognized that most of the
meals are generally unappetizing.' As a result of these inade-
quacies in prison food, the prisoners have been forced to "suffer
from malnutrition, poor health and disease."'57
9. Other Constitutional Rights
Although other federal constitutional protections are not
necessarily considered in each eighth amendment claim, they
are raised frequently in cases in which the totality of the condi-
tions test is used. Therefore, it seems appropriate to mention
briefly a few of the rights which often are involved in determin-
ing the constitutionality of prison or jail conditions.
Some prisoners have used the first amendment to attack
an institutional policy of censoring all outgoing and incoming
mail. ' The Supreme Court, in Procunier v. Martinez,"' ruled
that jails may censor mail if it is necessary to further a
"substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppres-
sion of expression."16' Such substantial interests could include
security, order and rehabilitation.' Second, the Court held
that censorship must be no greater than that which is necessary
v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 96 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger,
456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
'5 Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 323 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Newman
v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1977)(food stored
in dirty area, often infested by insects; food service personnel often did not follow
sanitation procedures); Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 880 (M.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd
in part, modified in part, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977)(most food was prepared by
untrained and unsupervised inmates who had not received health certificates; kitchen
facilities failed to comply with minimum health standards); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323
F. Supp. 93, 96 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th
Cir. 1972)(food was not stored in accordance with health regulations; kitchen ceiling
was traversed by sewage pipes which often leaked onto the floor).
10 Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 323 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd sub noma. Newman
v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1977)(food was unappe-
tizing); Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 880 (M.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd inpart, modified
in part, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977)(food was served cold).
"I Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873, 893 (W.D. Mo. 1977), aff'd in part,
modified in part, 570 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1978).
"I Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1310 (1974).
5 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
' Id. at 413.
I Id. "Prison officials may not censor inmate correspondence simply to eliminate
unflattering or unwelcome opinions or factually inaccurate statements." Id.
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to protect these interests.6 2 Some prisoners also have used the
first amendment to attack a jail's stringent visitation policy. "3
Finally, the amendment may be the basis for attacks on jail
regulations which inhibit inmates' religious practices. "4
Both the first and fourteenth amendments have been used
to challenge the inadequacies or absence of a law library. 65 In
Bounds v. Smith,'6" the Supreme Court ruled that indigent
inmates' rights of access to the courts under the Constitution
"requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the prepara-
tion and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prison-
ers with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from
persons trained in the law."'6 7 Similarly, inadequate facilities
for private attorney-client meetings have been challenged on
sixth amendment grounds."'
Finally, jail disciplinary procedures have been challenged
under the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
162 Id.
' Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873, 899 (W.D. Mo. 1977), aff'd in part,
modified in part, 570 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1978). The rationale behind this contention is
that the stringent visitation policies unnecessarily restrict the prisoner's rights to com-
municate with his family and friends. Id. See Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F. Supp. 886,
895 (N.D. Fla. 1976); Tate v. Kassulke, 409 F. Supp. 651, 655-56 (W.D. Ky. 1975)(one
fifteen-minute visitation period per week with only two visitors allowed and with only
five people listed as approved visitors was struck down as being overly broad and
stringent).
M4 Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F. Supp. 886, 895 (N.D. Fla. 1976)(no religious
facilities); Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 885 (M.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd in part,
modified in part, 563 F.2d 741 (8th Cir. 1977)(no special diet for religious observances,
no facilities for religious activity).
11 Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873, 898 (W.D. Mo. 1977), aff'd in part,
modified in part, 570 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1978) (no law library); Mitchell v. Untreiner,
421 F. Supp. 886, 891 (N.D. Fla. 1976)(no legal material available); Miller v. Carson,
401 F. Supp. 835, 885 (M.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd in part, modified in part, 563 F.2d 741
(5th Cir. 1977)(law library was inadequate). See Reeves, The Evolving Law of Prison
Law Libraries, 3 NEW ENG. J. PRISON L. 131 (1976).
"' 430 U.S. 817 (1977). For an analysis of Bounds, see Comment, The Impact of
Bounds v. Smith on City and County Jail Facilities, 67 Ky. L. J. 1064 (1978-79).
"7 430 U.S. at 828.
" Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873, 898 (W.D. Mo. 1977), aff'd in part,
modified in part, 570 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1978)(attorney-client meetings were not pri-
vate); Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F. Supp. 886, 891 (N.D. Fla. 1976)(attorney-client
meetings were not private and the visitation hours for such meetings were very re-
stricted); Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 886 (M.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd in part,
modified in part, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1978)(attorney-client calls were monitored;
attorney's visiting hours were restrictive; meeting rooms were inadequate).
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ments.115 In Miller v. Carson17 a disciplinary procedure was
invalidated because, among other grounds: (1) rules and penal-
ties were not posted; (2) prisoners did not receive adequate
notice of the charge against them; (3) a determination of guilt
was not made by an impartial factfinder; (4) prisoners were not
guaranteed the right to be heard; and (5) there was no guaran-
tee that the decision-making process complied with due process
requirements. 7'
D. Minimum Standards Under the Totality of the Conditions
Test
The nine factors identified above have consistently been
evaluated by courts under the totality of the conditions test.
After considering each of them separately, courts still must
determine if the eighth amendment's protective threshold has
been violated. As in the three traditional tests which were dis-
cussed earlier,' there is subjectivity involved in this final
weighing process. However, the totality of conditions test is
preferred because it allows for the development of minimum
standards which prisons and jails must meet in order to satisfy
constitutional strictures. Based upon each of the nine factors
and their respective weight, it is possible to frame a non-
exhaustive list of the minimum standards which courts have
created.
1 3
"I Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873, 894-95 (W.D. Mo. 1977), aff'd in part,
modified in part, 570 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1978); Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F. Supp. 886,
895 (N.D. Fla. 1976); Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 875 (M.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd
in part, modified in part, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1978). See also Note, Implications of
Morrisey v. Brewer for Prison Disciplinary Hearings in Indiana, 49 IND. L.J. 306 (1973-
74).
170 401 F. Supp. 835 (M.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd in part, modified in part, 563 F.2d 741
(5th Cir. 1977).
' Id. at 875.
' See notes 61-70 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of these three
tests utilized by federal courts in determining minimum conditions for jails to meet
the eighth amendment.
In This list is a compilation of the requirements formulated by the courts in the
cases cited in notes 93-171 supra. Since the courts do not agree as to precisely what
the minimum constitutional standards should be, the list is effective only in a general
way. However, it should be a useful guide in an evaluation of the conditions at any
jail or prison. This compilation also draws from some of the recommendations found
in Mesmer, Bourdon and Foley, Constitutional Guidelines for New Hampshire County
Jails and Houses of Correction, 4 NEw ENG. J. PRISON L. 83, 89-101 (1977).
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Minimum Standards
1. Overcrowding
1. A jail should house no more prisoners than design capacity allows.
2. Double-ceiling should be avoided if at all possible.
3. Each prisoner should have at least fifty square feet of floor space in his cell or
dormitory.
2. Staff
1. All staff personnel should receive adequate training.
2. Some personnel should be on duty at all times.
3. There should be an adequate number of personnel on duty at all times to ade-
quately protect the prisoners and to enable guards to enter the cells to aid a
prisoner.
3. Physical Facilities
1. Each cell should have sufficient light to enable the prisoner to read comfortably.
2. Each jail should be equipped with adequate ventilation, providing adequate heat
in the winter and cooling in the summer.
3. All plumbing and electrical work should be in good working order and should
conform with applicable building, housing and fire codes.
4. Each cell should have a sink with hot and cold water and a commode. Each
dormitory should have one toilet for every fifteen inmates, and one lavatory for
every ten inmates.
5. There should be an adequate number of showers to enable the inmates to shower
on a regular basis.
6. The jail should have an operable sprinkler system. Also, there should be an
evacuation plan to be used in the event of an emergency.
4. Sanitation and Personal Hygiene
1. The jail should be cleaned at regular intervals.
2. Cleaning supplies should be provided to the inmates to enable them to clean their
own cells.
3. There should be periodic extermination service to rid the jail of all vermin.
4. The jail should be inspected by local health officials.
5. Clean linen should be provided to every new prisoner and each inmate should
thereafter be issued clean linen periodically.
6. Every inmate should be issued a comb, toothbrush, toothpaste, soap and a razor
if he does not have them when he enters the jail.
7. Each inmate should be provided with adequate clothing. Provisions should be
made to allow the prisoners to clean their clothes or to have them cleaned.
5. Medical Services
1. Each inmate should be given a physical examination upon entry to the jail.
2. A doctor should be on call twenty-four hours a day.
3. There should be a daily sick call. However, nonmedical personnel should not be
allowed to determine whether medical attention is necessary.
4. A system should be implemented whereby medication is distributed only by
medical personnel.
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5. The jail should have an examination room which is properly equipped.
6. Dental care, both curative and preventive, should be provided on at least a part
time basis.
7. A system should be devised to transport inmates to a hospital quickly in case of
an emergency.
6. Classification
A classification system should be adopted which provides for the following:
1. Inmates should be segregated by sex.
2. Juveniles should be segregated from adults.
3. Pretrial detainees should not be put in a cell with a convicted inmate.
4. Special arrangements should be made for inmates who are violent, who suffer
from alcoholism, drug abuse or mental illness, and for those who are sexually
deviant.
7. Recreation, Education and Work
1. All inmates should be allowed some outdoor recreation. Indoor recreation should
also be provided.
2. If feasible, educational and occupational training should be provided.
8. Food
1. Food storage areas should be regularly cleaned and inspected.
2. The food should provide minimum nutritional requirements.
3. The kitchen and kitchen equipment should comply with the minimum standards
for public restaurants, and should be inspected by the health officer.
4. All kitchen personnel should receive regular medical examinations.
9. Mail
1. All mail may be checked for contraband. However, no mail should be censored
unless necessary to promote jail security, order, or rehabilitation.
2. Strict guidelines should be initiated to govern any censoring of mail.
10. Visitation
1. The jail should have a reasonable visitation policy. Visitation should be allowed
on more than one day for the friends and family of the inmate.
2. Adequate visitation facilities should be maintained.
11. Religion
1. An inmate should be allowed, within reason, to practice the religion of his choice.
2. Considerations should be given to special diets required by religious observances.
3. Some arrangement should be made to provide a facility to be used by the inmates
in their religious practices.
12. Attorneys' Visits
1. A liberal visitation policy should be instituted to include visits by attorneys.
2. Private facilities should be maintained for use by the attorney and the inmate.
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13. Law Library
The jail should provide an adequate law library for use by the inmates. In the alterna-
tive, some program should be initiated to provide the inmates with comparable legal
materials or legal aid.
14. Discipline
1. Jail rules and penalties should be posted.
2. Each inmate should be fully informed of any charge against him.
3. Each inmate charged with breaking a rule should be given a fair hearing, and
should have the chance to present his own case.
Under the totality of the conditions test, failure to meet
one of the above standards does not automatically mean that
the eighth amendment has been violated.174 Rather, courts are
required to weigh all of the factors and determine if the cumu-
lative effect of any or all of these factors results in cruel and
unusual punishment.' As stated above, this test allows for
some judicial subjectivity, but it provides a steady guide for the
jail officials, the prisoners and the courts.
II. EVALUATING KENTUCKY'S LocAL JAS
UNDER THE TOTALITY OF THE CONDITIONS TEST
By applying the totality of the conditions test to Ken-
tucky's local jails, certain conclusions can be reached about the
problems now facing jail administrators in Kentucky. These
conclusions, however, have two limitations. First, there is a
scarcity of current, extensive research data on local jail condi-
tions in Kentucky.176 Most of the available data is at least five
"I' For example, in West v. Edwards, 439 F. Supp. 722 (D.S.C. 1977), evidence was
introduced to show that the jail was overcrowded. However, none of the other factors
which have been identified herein were present. The court held overcrowding, absent
other conditions, did not violate the eighth amendment.
,75 Punitive Conditions, supra note 62, at 908-09:
[J]udges and prison officials must determine the types, degrees and
number of prison conditions necessary to trigger the prohibition of the cruel
and unusual punishment clause. Although the answer to this question is an
equation replete with variables; there is one constant, suggested by Pugh [v.
Locke] and expressed elsewhere: "[T]he constitutionality of the conditions
of confinement depends both on the details of those conditions and the
duration of the confinement."
Id., quoting Osborn v. Manson, 359 F. Supp. 1107, 1110 (D. Conn. 1973).
"I Mr. Fred A. James, former Director of the Division for Regional Jails, Bureau
of Corrections, furnished excerpts from an incompleted compilation of a survey of the
city and county jail facilities in Kntucky for the author's use. A copy of these excerpts
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years old and may be outdated. Second, any conclusions will
be general. As was demonstrated above under the totality of
the conditions test, a jail may be deficient in several areas and
still comply with the Constitution. Consequently, without fo-
cusing on specific jails, it is impossible to determine precisely
how many jails fail to meet minimum constitutional standards.
Even with these limitations, an application of the test to Ken-
tucky's local jails is beneficial inasmuch as it will identify ex-
isting problems as they relate to the nine factors under the
totality of the conditions test.
Overcrowding does not appear to be a prevalent problem
among local jails in Kentucky. For example, although a major-
ity of county jails are designed to hold fewer than twenty in-
mates, 77 most are never more than one-third full.' Often,
many of these jails are empty.' Although the jails do not house
more prisoners than they were designed to hold, many still may
not provide sufficient space for each prisoner. For example,
fifty-four local jails do not provide day rooms for the prison-
ers,""0 which means that the prisoner is confined to his cell
during his period of incarceration. If these cells do not give each
prisoner at least fifty square feet of floor space, a jail may be
deemed to be "overcrowding" the prisoner even though it is
operating at less than full capacity.'' Although current data on
[hereinafter cited as Jail Survey Excerpts] is on file at the KENTUCKY LAW JouRmAL
offices.
I" County Jail Reform in Kentucky, supra note 4, at 133, citing KENTUCKY Com-
MISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIME PREVENTION, REPORT ON KENTUCKY JAILS
(1969).
178 Id.
,,9 Id.
"8 Jail Survey Excerpts, supra note 176.
... An example is the Campbell County jail in Newport, Kentucky. In August of
1978, a suit was filed in the United States District Court, Eastern District of Kentucky,
challenging the conditions of the Campbell County Jail. Sebastian v. Heil, Civ. No.
78-76 (E.D.Ky., filed Aug. 21, 1978). In connection with this suit, a report on the jail
was prepared by Anthony S. Kuharich, a jail consultant from Illinois. One of the
findings of this report is that the Campbell County jail provides an inadequate amount
of space for each prisoner. For example, the first floor confinement area is composed
of two cell blocks. Each cell block has three cells and a day room. Each cell has four
bunks and forty-two square feet of floor space. However, thrity-two square feet of the
floor space is taken up by bunks, leaving only ten square feet of floor space for four
prisoners, or 2.5 square feet per prisoner. The day room has 270 square feet, or 22.5
square feet per prisoner based upon full occupancy. Therefore, if the cell block is full,
and the floor space covered by the bunks is excluded, each prisoner has twenty-five
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this problem is unavailable, it is likely that it remains in a
number of the older and smaller jails.
Understaffing is clearly a problem which is evident in
many of Kentucky's local jails. In the 1970 National Jail Cen-
sus, forty-eight of Kentucky's county jails reported having no
full time employees." 2 Twenty-two of those jails reported hav-
ing only one full-time or one part-time employee.1M These facts
would indicate that a large number of the county jails are oper-
ated exclusively or primarily by the elected county jailer."4
Another problem with the staffing of the jails is that, as a
general rule, no training is required to run for the office of jailer
or to serve as a deputy jailer."5
The physical conditions of Kentucky's local jails are by far
the single most serious deficiency under the totality test. In the
1970 National Jail Census, Kentucky reported having 332 cells
which were over 100 years old.' As of 1976, sixty percent of
Kentucky's jails were over fifty years old and twenty jails were
over one hundred years old. 8 ' Because of their age, numerous
problems inhere in the physical facilities. A 1974 Kentucky
square feet of floor space. Even if the bunk space is not excluded, each prisoner would
have only thirty-three square feet of floor space, well below the fifty square feet re-
quired by most courts. Report on the Campbell County Jail, at 4-5 (Jan. 8-10, 1979).
A copy of this report is on file at the KENTUCKY LAw JoURNAL offices.
W LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DE'T OF JUSTICE NAT'L
CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION AND STATISTICS SERVICE, REPORT SC-1A, LOCAL JAiLS, 374-
79 (1973).
in Id.
i4 One of the major reasons for inadequate staffing is that employees of the jail
(deputy jailers) in the smaller counties (less than 75,000 people) are paid by the fiscal
court of each county. Also, the jailer is allowed to appoint only two deputies and one
matron (female deputy), unless the fiscal court approves otherwise. In counties with
more than 75,000 people, the deputies are paid out of the fees collected by the jailer.
LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION, THE COUNTY FEE SYSTEM: A NEED FOR REVISION,
RESEARCH REPORT No. 63, p. 46 (Nov. 1971) [hereinafter cited as COUNTY FEE SYSTEM].
The fiscal courts usually spend no more money than is absolutely necessary for the
county jails. As one writer noted: "Fiscal courts, especially in rural areas, are hard
pressed to spend money on county jails when funds are not even available to maintain
the county courthouse properly." County Jail Reform in Kentucky, supra note 4, at
139.
in County Jail Reform in Kentucky, supra note 4, at 139.
IN LAw ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. D P'T OF JUSTICE NAT'L
CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION AND STATISTICS SERVICE, SERIES SC-No. 1, NAT'L JAIL
CENSUS 17 (1971) [hereinafter cited as JAIL CENSUS]. Only three states, Massachusetts,
Ohio, and Pennsylvania, had more cells over 100 years old. Id.
I" County Jail Reform in Kentucky, supra note 4, at 133.
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Public Health Association Task Force on Prison and Jail
Health found that: "Thirty-one percent of the institutions sur-
veyed had inadequate lavatories, with six percent having no
lavatory facilities at all available to prisoners. Twenty-three
percent did not have hot and cold running water. Seventeen
percent had no showers or bathing facilities . . . .Fifty-four
percent of the institutions had inadequate heating."'88 As of
1979, seventy-six jails lacked air conditioning and seventy did
not provide for exhaust or return of the air in the cell.' 0
A corollary problem is that many of the jails have no sprin-
kler or alarm system and are constructed in such a way as to
make evacuation difficult. Eighty-one local jails have no smoke
detection device and ninety-five have no alarm system. 0
Sixty-nine of the jails are not even equipped with fire hoses or
extinguishers, and 111 jails are not equipped with sprinkler
systems. Furthermore, seventy-two jails lack any means of
egress in the event of an emergency."' Clearly, many of Ken-
tucky's local jails are seriously deficient in safety provision for
their inmates.
Another problem related to the age of the local jails is that
sanitation is not always maintained at an acceptable level. An
investigation in 1974 revealed "[i]nsects and rodents . . .in
33 percent of the institutions surveyed; 29 percent did not em-
ploy a commercial pest control operator. Few of the jails used
screens to prevent insects from entering the building.""' 2 Based
upon these findings, the Task Force concluded that "[i]f the
same requirements for an average restaurant were applied to
jail facilities, seventeen percent of the institutions would be
closed." g3
IS Id. at 136, citing TASK FORCE ON PRISON AND JAIL HEALTH, TmR CAmovr PATm-NT:
PRISON HETH CARE, at 23.
"I Jail Survey Excerpts, supra note 176. A good example of inadequate ventilation
can be found in the Anderson County jail in Lawrenceburg, Kentucky. In this jail, the
ventilation in the mens' cells consists of a six-inch square area of holes leading to the
outside, each hole being about the size of a pencil. Anderson News, Oct. 4, 1979, at
20, col. 4.
10 Jail Survey Excerpts, supra note 176.
191 Id.
M92 County Jail Reform in Kentucky, supra note 4, at 136, citing TASK FORCE
REPORT at 27.
"I Id. at 137, citing TASK FORCE REPORT at 35.
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There is little data on the maintenance of personal hygiene
of the prisoners in local jails. However, there are some indica-
tions that the prisoner's personal hygiene often suffers while
incarcerated. For instance, in 1974 it was reported that over
sixty percent of the local jails "provided no sheets or pillows to
the inmates" and thirty-eight percent provided no towels.2"
Also, there is little reason to believe that the prisoners in the
smaller jails are furnished such items as a comb, toothbrush,
razor, or adequate clothing. Obviously the jailer cannot afford
to furnish such items out of his meager salary. 9 '
The lack of medical facilities is another major problem
facing Kentucky's local jails. As of this year, 108 local jails had
no medical examining room." ' This situation may create cir-
cumstances like those found in the Campbell County jail where
the doctor is forced to hold sick call in the jail kitchen." Few,
if any, jails employ a physician on a full-time basis. As a result,
it is probable that few of the prisoners receive examinations
prior to admittance to the jail.9 8 Lack of a physician also may
cause the prisoner to be dependent upon the jailer for his medi-
cal needs. As one writer noted: "In a majority of situations,
nonmedical personnel determined who needed medical atten-
tion. The jailer was most often the person to decide; he not only
had to decide who needed routine medical care, but also who
needed emergency care and treatment for delirium tremens or
drug overdoses." '' Other jail medical problems that occur fre-
quently include the lack of any medical records kept by the jail
officials"' and the dispensing of medication by nonmedical per-
sonnel.20" '
'"Id. at 136, citing TASK FORCE REPORT at 23.
,,5 As a rule, few jailers in the smaller counties make enough money to live ade-
quately. The reason is that under the fee system, the jailer is compensated a very small
per diem rate for each prisoner. Since these jails have few prisoners, the jailer does not
make enough money to furnish such items to the prisoners. See CouNTY FEE SYSTEM,
supra note 184, at 47. See also County Jail Reform in Kentucky, supra note 4, at 143
(In 1973, fifty-five of the county jailers made less than $10,000 per year and fifteen
made less than $5,000 per year).
,'Jail Survey Excerpts, supra note 176.
,, Report on the Campbell County Jail, supra note 181, at 23.
,,S See, e.g., id. at 22.
"' County Jail Reform in Kentucky, supra note 4, at 137, citing TASK FORCE
REPORT at 65-66.
Id., citing TASK FORCE REPORT at 71.
=' Report on the Campbell County Jail, supra note 181, at 23.
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The only classifications of prisoners in local jails required
by Kentucky law is that there be a separation of men from
women,22 juveniles from adults0 3 and regular inmates from
mentally disturbed inmates.2 4 Use of any other type of classifi-
cation at local jails would therefore seem to depend upon the
preference of the local jailer. There is no data available to
determine if any type of classification beyond that required by
state law is utilized in the local jails, but there is evidence that
many of the jails are unable to even carry out the limited classi-
fication required by law. Fifty-four local jails are unable to
provide maximum separation of men and women2 5 and sixty-
three jails are unable to provide maximum separation between
male juveniles and adults.2 8 Fifty-one facilities provide no sep-
arate quarters for mentally disturbed inmates.0 7 Since these
jails are unable to carry out the limited classification required
by state law, it is doubtful that they would utilize any other
type of classification system.
Because of the age and size of a number of local jails, most
do not offer any recreational, educational or occupational op-
portunities. According to the 1970 National Jail Census, 95.1%
of Kentucky's local jails had no recreational facilities and
96.7% had no educational facilities .2  Therefore, in most in-
stances prisoners are forced to remain indoors and idle for the
duration of their incarceration.
There is very little data regarding the food service in Ken-
tucky's local jails. Likewise, there is no data on compliance
with other constitutional rights of the prisoners in those jails.
Therefore, no conclusions may be drawn with regard to these
factors under the totality of the conditions test.
Based upon the above presentation, it seems evident that
a significant number of Kentucky's local jails fail to meet the
12 902 Ky. AnMn. REG. 9:010 § 3(5) (1979).
203 Ky. REV. STAT. § 208.120 (Supp. 1977).
204 902 Ky. ADAIN. REG. 9:010 § 3(5) (1979).
2 Jail Survey Excerpts, supra note 176.
204 Id.
227 Id.
2 JAm CENsus, supra note 186, at 18. See also, Report on the Campbell County
Jail, supra note 181, at 11. This jail had no facilities for either indoor or outdoor
recreation and exercise. The jail consultant recommended that an outdoor recreational
area be provided by erecting a chain link fence around an area adjacent to the jail. Id.
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minimum standards required by federal courts under the total-
ity of the conditions test. Thus, these jails are susceptible to
lawsuits by prisoners challenging the conditions of the jails."0'
If these suits are successful, the local governments could be
faced with the choice of closing their jails or spending large
sums of money to correct their constitutional deficiencies. This
dilemma places the local governments between the proverbial
rock and the hard place. On the one hand, under Kentucky
law, counties are required to maintain and operate a county
jail. 1' But, on the other hand, the federal courts have said
repeatedly that if the states and their local governments are
going to operate jails, they must meet constitutional stan-
dards.211 Furthermore, the federal courts have consistently held
that lack of funds is not a valid excuse for operating jails which
violate inmates' constitutional rights.212
The foregoing discussion clearly identifies the problems
which now face the city and county governments throughout
Kentucky. They are problems which have no easy answers and
no cheap solutions. It is apparent that they cannot be ade-
quately solved at the local level, because local governments
have neither the expertise nor the financial ability to correct
the constitutional deficiencies existing in the jails. Any viable
solution to these problems necessarily must come from the
state government which has both the expertise and financial
ability to solve them.
209 There are at least two lawsuits pending which challenge the constitutionality
of physical conditions at county jails. They involve the Campbell County Jail and the
Clark County Jail. Both suits are docketed in the Federal District Court for the Eastern
District of Kentucky.
210 Ky. REV. STAT. § 67.080 (4) (Supp. 1977). This statute has been interpreted by
the Kentucky Attorney General in a recent opinion to mean that "a fiscal court has a
continuing duty to maintain an adequate county jail." Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. 78-129.
According to this opinion, the fiscal court cannot avoid budgetary problems by closing
its jail.
211 See Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1320 (5th Cir. 1974); Palnigiano v. Gar-
rahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 985 (D.R.I. 1977); Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F. Supp. 886, 894
(N.D. Fla. 1976).
212 See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1319-20 (5th Cir. 1974); Palmigiano
v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 985 (D.R.I. 1977). See also Hamilton v. Love, 328 F.
Supp. 1182, 1194 (E.D. Ark. 1971): "Inadequate resources can never be an adequate
justification for the state's depriving any person of his constitutional rights. If the state
cannot obtain resources to detain persons awaiting trial in accordance with minimum
constitutional standards, then the state simply will not be permitted to detain such
persons."
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III. KENTUCKY DIsTRIcT JAIL PROPOSAL
The 1978 Kentucky General Assembly created a Special
Task Force to study the Commonwealth's legal system. A sub-
committee of this Task Force analyzed the problems of the
local jails in an attempt to formulate proposed legislation for
the 1980 legislative session."'s This subcommittee conducted
meetings throughout the state and collected testimony from
various state and local officials concerning the problems of the
local jails. The subcommittee also received a concept paper
prepared by the Kentucky Bureau of Corrections on implemen-
tation of a district jail system. 214 The subcommittee recom-
mended that the proposal submitted by the Bureau of Correc-
tions "be adopted as a base for future legislation." ' The Task
Force adopted this recommendation in September, 1979.1'
Under the plan created by the Bureau of Corrections, the
district jail system would consist of three types of detention
facilities. The first type would be the district jail. The plan
calls for 36 district jails to be located strategically throughout
the state."7 These jails would serve as the primary detention
facility for most state prisoners.1 8 A candidate for jailer would
2,W LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMISSION, ISSUES CONFRONTING TRE 1980 GENERAL AS-
SEMBLY, INFORMATIONAL BurLEm No. 131, (1979). The 1980 Kentucky General Assem-
bly had not enacted the proposed district jail plan as this Note went to press, and the
probability of enactment in 1980 appeared slight. The plan, as embodied in SB.278,
was referred to the Committee on Counties and Special Districts in an effort to resolve
funding difficulties. Lack of appropriations from the general budget presented a serious
obstacle. See Minutes of the Committee on Counties and Special Districts (March 13,
1980) Kentucky General Assembly, 1980 session.
211 KENTUCKY BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, DRAr CONCEPT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
A COMPREHENsIVE DisTmor JAIL SYSTEM, (1979) [hereinafter cited as DRAFT CONCEFr]
A copy of this paper is on file at the KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL offices.
211 Anderson News, Sept. 20, 1979, at 22, col. 4.
216 Id.
2"7 DRAFT CONCEPT, supra note 214, at 6. These jails would be located in the most
populous regions of the state. The counties in which these jails would be located
contain more than seventy-five percent of the state's population and presently hold
more than seventy percent of the state's prison population. Id.
"I Id. at 5. This proposal identified nine functions of the district jail:
a) detention for all offenders arrested in the respective county containing
the district jail;
b) detention of misdemeanants from surrounding counties with sentences
exceeding thirty (30) days;
c) detention of pre-sentenced felons from surrounding counties, post ar-
raignment;
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be required to meet certain qualifications to be eligible for
election by the public.21 The state would pay the jailer a fixed
salary,220 and would also assume responsibility for operating
and staffing the jail.21
The district jail system would be phased into operation
over a six-year period. In the 1980-1982 Biennium, ten existing
county jails would be certified to serve as district jails. These
jails are fairly new, and would require only "minimal expendi-
tures for facility modification, primarily in the areas of safety
equipment and recreation space." Fifteen additional jails
would be certified in the 1982-1984 Biennium. These jails
would require some construction of building additions and
some facility upgrading.223 The final eleven jails would be
added during the 1984-1986 Biennium. These facilities would
have to be newly built since the remaining existing facilities
cannot be renovated to meet minimum standards.22 Local gov-
ernmental units would be required to finance any renovation
and construction of the district jails.
The second type of facility under this proposal is the
"feeder" jail. Located in forty different counties, the feeder
jails would be used "to provide detention support to the district
jails. ' 226 If the jailer meets minimum training requirements,
d) detention of pre-release or gradual release felons;
e) implementation of comprehensive care programs and mental diagnostic
services;
f) utilization of educational and vocational training programs;
g) utilization of work release and public works release programs;
h) provisions for recreational and leisure time programs;
i) local base for Community Services staff.
Id. at 5-6.
21" Id. at 5. The report states that these qualifications would be similar to those
now required of the Property Valuation Administrator. Although this definition is
somewhat unclear, it indicates that each candidate would be required to pass some
test showing the candidate's skill in jail management.
22 Id.
,2' Id. at 5, 7. The state would provide personnel in the following areas: security,
food service, maintenance, health and treatment. Id. at 7.
m Id. at 7.
m Id.
rid.
SId.
211 Id. at 8. These jails would serve four functions:
"1) detention of presentenced misdemeanants;
2) detention of misdemeants with sentences less than thirty (30) days
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the state would pay his yearly salary. However, the state would
not be responsible for staffing the jail, although the jail would
be required "to meet minimal staffing levels and training re-
quirements" before it could be certified.12 The state would
reimburse "the county for all operating costs, such as: food,
utilities, medical, and supplies . .2.2."I Additionally, the
state would reimburse the county for all costs incurred while
transporting the prisoner. Like the district jails, the feeder jails
would be phased in over a six-year period. Again, the local jails
would be responsible for any renovation or construction neces-
sary to bring the jails up to minimum standards."'
The third type would be temporary holding facilities which
would be located in the forty-four counties which have neither
a district jail nor a feeder jail.20 Upon meeting minimum physi-
cal plant standards and staff training requirements, the jails
would be certified by the state.ml These jails "would be used
primarily as temporary detention for offenders arrested in the
respective county, with a holding limit of seventy-two (72)
hours. ' '2 2 If the prisoner is not released before the end of the
seventy-two hour period, he is then transported to a feeder jail.
State support of these jails "would be limited to medical and
transporation costs." Presumably, the fee system would still
be utilized to pay the salaries of the jailer in these counties, as
well as to provide for the feeding of the prisoners. These jails
would also be phased in over a six-year period, and, presuma-
bly, the local governments would be responsible for any renova-
tion and construction.
At the end of the 1984-1986 Biennium, the district jail
system would be fully implemented. At that time, no county
or longer if work release is included;
3) detention of prearraigned felons and whose trial date is greater
than thirty (30) days;
4) detention of gradual releases."
Id. at 9.
22 Id. at 9.
22 Id.
Id. at 8, 9 (by implication).
2 Id. at 9-10.
"I Id. at 10.
232 Id.
3 Id.
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seat in Kentucky would be further than twenty-five miles from
either a feeder jail or a district jail,2' and all counties would
have some type of detention facility.
The Bureau of Corrections also included a cost projection
for their district jail proposal. Although this projection is only
an estimate, it gives some idea of the total costs of the imple-
mentation. The Bureau calculated the total cost for the first
Biennium, 1980-1982, to be $9,117,439.25 The second Bien-
nium, 1982-1984, would require $13,400,000, with another
$9,600,000 needed in the third Biennium, 1984-1986.21
There are several advantages to a system such as that
proposed by the Bureau of Corrections. First, it would ensure
that the local jails which hold prisoners for any significant
period of time would meet most, if not all, of the minimum
standards established under the totality of the conditions test.
This would serve to preclude most judicially-ordered reform
and the problems that it would present.27 The system would
provide for centralized administration and management of the
jails, thus reducing duplicative services and producing cost
benefits."' Also, it would provide more services to the prison-
ers, such as misdemeanant programming, mental health pro-
grams and gradual release programs.?'
However, this proposal is not without its problems. First,
it would cost a tremendous amount of money over a six-year
period. During this era of fiscal conservatism, legislators will
not view a large expenditure of funds with favor. Also, this plan
will require major capital outlays by some counties to renovate
their existing jails or to construct new ones. This burden will
not be received well by already financially-pressed county gov-
ernments. A second problem under the plan is that a prisoner
will likely be incarcerated in some place other than his own
community. This situation could work a hardship on the family
2 Id. at 8-9.
2 Id. at 16.
2, Id. at 17.
2 Id. at 2-3. In many of the cases involving challenges to jail conditions, federal
courts have shown a willingness to delay final judgment if an effort is being made to
upgrade conditions at the jail. See Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873, 876-80 (W.D.
Mo. 1977), affd in part, modified in part, 570 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1978).
2 DRAFr CoNcEPr, supra note 214, at 4.
2, Id. at 3-4.
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of the prisoner since they would be required to travel in order
to visit, and additional money and staff would be required to
transport the prisoner from the jail to the community where the
offense occurred. Third, many counties may be unwilling to
relinquish control of their jails to the state. 4 '
Even with these problems, the district jail proposal serves
to eliminate many of the aforementioned problems which exist
in Kentucky's local jails. If implemented fully and financed
adequately, the district jail system could make Kentucky's
jails acceptable to both the federal judiciary and to society as
a whole.
CONCLUSION
The people of Kentucky and their elected representatives
will face hard decisions in the 1980's. For too long, the state
legislature has abdicated its duty to ensure that its local jails
meet minimum constitutional standards, even in the face of a
growing activism on the part of the federal courts in the area
of jail reform. The time has come for the legislature to shoulder
this burden and to implement some type of program upgrading
the conditions in Kentucky jails.
Should the legislators fail to act on this problem, they will
leave Kentucky's jails susceptible to judicially-ordered reform.
The choice is between a systematic program adopted by the
legislature and reform ordered by the federal judiciary on a
case by case basis. Clearly, the former choice is preferable for
all concerned. Thus, the legislature should take some type of
prompt action to provide that the conditions of the local jails
meet the minimum constitutional standards as required under
the totality of the conditions test. The district jail proposal, or
some variation thereof, would largely ensure that the local jails
meet these standards. For this reason, the proposal merits seri-
ous consideration by the Kentucky General Assembly.
Wm. Barry Birdwhistell
240 These problems are discussed generally in the REPoRT TO THE CONGRESS BY THE
COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES: CONDITIONS IN LoCAL JAILS RMAIN INADE-
QUATE DESPITE FEDERAL FUNDING FOR IMPROVEMENTS, 9-10 (1976).
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